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ARTICLE
United we stand, divided we fall: the early Nietzsche
on the struggle for organisation
James S. Pearson
Philosophy, Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
According to Nietzsche, both modern individuals and societies are pathologi-
cally fragmented. In this paper, I examine how he proposes we combat this
aﬄiction in his Untimely Meditations. I argue that he advocates a dual struggle
involving both instrumental domination and eradication. On these grounds, I
claim the following: 1. pace a growing number of commentators, we cannot
categorise the species of conﬂict he endorses in the Untimely Meditations as
agonistic; and 2. this conﬂict is better understood as analogous to the species of
struggle that Schopenhauer describes in his account of purposive organisation.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 14 May 2017; Accepted 7 May 2018
KEYWORDS Nietzsche; Agon; Schopenhauer; Conﬂict; Organisation
Donning the mantel of cultural physician, the early Nietzsche diagnoses
modern Europeans as suﬀering from a pathological form of disintegration:
‘we see that everything is hostile to everything else and all the noble forces
are engaged in a mutually devastating war of annihilation’ (WEN, 187; KSA,
7:30[8], 734).1 What is more, he informs us that this aﬄiction manifests itself
at both the psychological level of the individual (i.e., amongst our values
and behavioural impulses) and the social level of the community (i.e.,
between social agents). But what course of treatment does Nietzsche pre-
scribe as an antidote to this ubiquitous state of disorder?
There is at present a tendency to interpret Nietzsche as proposing that we
remedy disintegration by transforming antagonistic into agonistic relations.2 In
other words, rather than seeking to altogether pacify the elements that are at
variance with one another, we should endeavour to hold them in a state of
tensemutual struggle; yet, ex hypothesi, this should be a species of struggle that
leads to the empowerment, as opposed to the detriment, of the whole in
question. In this paper, I refute the agonistic interpretive approach by
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demonstrating its profound incompatibility with Nietzsche’s conception of
organisation in his Untimely Meditations (hereafter UM).
Those propounding this reading take their notion of agonal conﬂict from
Nietzsche’s early writings on the ancient Greek agon, particularly his early
unpublished essay ‘Homer’s Contest’ (hereafter HC). According to Nietzsche,
the ancient Greeks productively channelled their desire for strife and tri-
umph away from murderously destructive struggle (Vernichtungskampf) and
into measured contest (Agon, Wettkampf) (HC, 95–6).3 Such measured com-
petition was omnipresent in ancient Greece – in philosophy, the arts,
juridical fora, and, perhaps most obviously, in sporting contests. Following
thinkers such as Jacob Burckhardt and Ernst Curtius, Nietzsche famously
praised this culture of contest on account of its socially salubrious eﬀects:
the combined activity of each citizen striving to improve themselves in an
envious eﬀort to outstrip their neighbours issued in an overall ﬂourishing of
society. Nietzsche thus aﬃrmatively cites the proem to an edition of
Hesiod’s Work and Days, which states that such a culture of contest ‘drives
even the unskilled man to work; and if someone who lacks property sees
someone else who is rich, he likewise hurries oﬀ to sow and plant and set
his house in order’ (HC, 97).
For our current purposes, we should remark that Nietzsche’s concept of
agonal struggle is deﬁned by three necessary criteria:
(1) It is conceptually opposed to destructive struggle (Vernichtungskampf) – in
agonal competition, one does not annihilate, or seek to annihilate, one’s
opponent (HC, 97).
(2) It takes place between parties of approximately equal ability (with
respect to the competitive practice in question). Such parity is necessary
to elicit the envy and ambition that motivates agonal contest: I am
neither envious of those whom I consider to be vastly superior, nor do
I entertain any ambitions of outdoing them. It was for this reason that
excessively superior individuals were ostracised from ancient Greek
agonal societies (HC, 98).4
(3) It does not establish instrumental relations such that losers are placed in
a relation of servitude to the victors. Dominance is nominal and, con-
gruent with this, the struggle is most commonly conceived by Nietzsche
as a struggle for fame (Ruhm, Nachruhm) (HC, 98).
Given the socially strengthening eﬀect that Nietzsche attributes to agonal
conﬂict in HC, and the fact that he frames such struggle as an alternative to
destructive conﬂict, it is remarkable that in UM, where we ﬁnd his most
sustained attempt in the early phase of his oeuvre to overcome the problem
of disintegration, there is no mention of agonal contest (i.e. Agon or
Wettkampf). So can we justiﬁably read the early Nietzsche as petitioning us to
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cultivate agonal relations in order to redress the problem of disunity? To be
sure, some commentators have analysed the cultural therapies he proposes in
UM through the hermeneutic lens of HC.5 The critical thesis I defend in this
paper, however, is that his prescriptions in UM are patently unagonistic insofar
as they contravene the aforementioned criteria of agonal contest.
My positive contention, on the other hand, will be that far more light can
be shed on Nietzsche’s early struggle for organisation if we analyse it
through the interpretive prism of Schopenhauer’s thoughts on purposive
organisation (Zweckmäßigkeit) in the ﬁrst volume of The World as Will and
Representation (hereafter WWR I).6 I take issue with the assumption that
Schopenhauer had little inﬂuence on Nietzsche’s thought during UM. As
Cavell matter-of-factly asserts apropos the second meditation:
‘Schopenhauer, as everyone notes, is scarcely present in the text’.7 Others
have also claimed that Nietzsche more generally abandoned
Schopenhauer’s conception of organisation as of the late 1860s.8 Contrary
to this position, I will argue that Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in viewing
organisation as the fruit of a dual struggle for, on the one side, the instru-
mental domination of that which is deemed serviceable, and, on the other,
the eradication of that which is deemed redundant or injurious.
As will become evident, what is at stake in approximating Nietzsche’s
project to his vision of the agonal Greeks is that one risks unduly softening
his prescriptions and neglecting the cogent reasons he proﬀers for engaging
in eradicatory and exploitative modes of contention. It should be observed
that in bringing these reasons into relief and exposing a novel conception of
ﬂourishing psychological and political unity, this study has a relevance that
extends beyond the conﬁnes of Nietzsche studies. Not only do the argu-
ments that will be reconstructed below further develop the challenge that
Nietzsche presents to contemporary proponents of egalitarian politics, but
they also problematize non-exclusionary theories of value pluralism (such as
we ﬁnd in the work of William Connolly, for example). From a Nietzschean
perspective, as we will see, both of these theories are guilty of a harmful and
misguided breed of idealism.
In the ﬁrst section, I give a symptomology and etiology of what Nietzsche
diagnoses as modern disunity, that is to say, I inquire into how this pathol-
ogy concretely manifests itself and establish its causes. In the following
section, I then expound his proposed remedies. I begin by highlighting
how, in WWR, Schopenhauer develops an account of organisation that is
markedly unagonistic in kind. In the remaining sections, I illuminate how
Nietzsche’s proposed therapies paradigmatically replicate the unagonistic
structure of Schopenhauer’s vision of organisation and its origins. I conclude
that we should therefore refrain from employing Nietzsche’s notion of the
agon as a heuristic device when trying to elucidate the struggle being
promoted in UM.
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1. Diagnosing the crisis of cultural disintegration
In his opening meditation, ‘David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer’
(hereafter DS), Nietzsche criticises the Germans for complacently believing
their military victory in the Franco-Prussian war to have been accompanied by
a corresponding cultural triumph. He reprimands them for their erroneous
conviction ‘that struggle and bravery are no longer required’ (DS 1, p.4). But to
what kind of cultural struggle is Nietzsche rallying his compatriots, whom he
pejoratively labels ‘cultural philistines’ and ‘barbarians’ (DS 2, p.7)? In trying to
address this question, it is instructive to recall Nietzsche’s oft-cited deﬁnition
of barbarism as the ‘lack of style or a chaotic jumble of all styles’ (DS 1, pp.5–6),
and, contrariwise, true culture as the ‘unity of artistic style in all the expres-
sions of the life of a people’. In calling Germans barbarians, then, Nietzsche is
accusing them of lacking precisely this kind of unity, of being a fragmented
‘modern fairground motley’ (DS 1, p.6) and ‘atomistic chaos’ (‘Schopenhauer
as Educator’ [the third meditation, hereafter SE] 4, p.150). We can surmise
from this that they must therefore struggle for harmony and against discord.
Before we take a closer look at the precise nature of his ideal, though, we
should ﬁrst dissect what Nietzsche means by fragmentation.
On Nietzsche’s analysis, one of the root causes of German barbarism is an
excess of historical learning (Wissenschaft) and the superﬁciality of the
German approach to education. As a result, Germans have become mere
‘walking encyclopaedias’ (‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’
[the second meditation, hereafter HL] 4, p.79). Yet amassing knowledge
does not strike us as harmful or disintegrative in itself. So why does he
deem it a pathology and how does it cause fragmentation? In DS,
Nietzsche’s chief allegation is that philistinism obstructs authentic agency,
especially aesthetic and ethical agency. With respect to the former, he
complains that due to the study of sundry languages, literary expression
has deteriorated into a ‘soulless mosaic of words’, with writers clumsily
employing an awkward combination of Latin and French styles (DS 11,
p.50). Consequently, these authors lack the ‘natural basis’ and capacity for
‘artistic evaluation’ needed ‘to become even a mediocre and tolerable
writer’ (DS 11, p.48). Nietzsche therefore scorns this disarray of styles
because it leaves potential artists in want of the ﬁxed set of rules and
criteria of judgement that they require to guide their artistic practice.
Nietzsche also condemns the German proclivity for accumulating
inordinate quantities of knowledge on account of its having thwarted
ethical agency. The problem is that one simply cannot implement all of
the ethical models that one has ingested from past cultures – namely, on
account of their incompatibility. For example, in SE he criticises the toing
and froing (Hin und Her) generated in the individual by the conﬂicting
ideals of Christianity and antiquity. The struggle of these value systems
4 J. S. PEARSON
‘engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which con-
demns it to a joyless unfruitfulness’ (SE 2, p.133). In presenting the
individual with incompatible maxims and models for action, such dis-
cordance ultimately paralyses the individual in a manner reminiscent of
Buridan’s ass.
The second form of harmful disintegration indexed by Nietzsche con-
cerns the chasm he identiﬁes between the inner (i.e., private and intellec-
tual) and outer (i.e., public and practical) aspects of the individual’s life. In HL
4, he recounts how, as a result of her inner havoc, the modern individual has
simply abandoned the toilsome task of practically implementing her
acquired knowledge. In lieu of doing so, she has simply turned inwards,
disregarding the task of taking authentic decisions as to how to intercourse
with others and present herself to the outside world (HL 4, p.79).9 In their
eﬀort to circumvent the problem of practically applying this internal bedlam
of ethical and artistic models, modern Germans simply defer to convention
and the imitation of others: ‘[N]o one dares to appear as he is, but masks
himself as a cultivated man, as a scholar, as a poet, as a politician’ (ibid.). To
the extent that they thereby fail to exteriorise their personal inner life,
Nietzsche maintains that Germans suﬀer from a ‘weakness of personality’
(HL 10, p.116). What is most harmful about the resultant atmosphere of
conformism, however, is the way in which it impedes the cultivation of true
individuals. Any nascent true individuals are forced to suppress, rather than
nurture, their uniqueness out of ‘fear of [their] neighbour, who demands
conventionality’ (SE 1, p.127). This, then, is what Nietzsche is rebuking when
he emphatically lambasts ‘the antithesis of form and content, of inwardness
and convention’ (HL 4, p.82).
The third species of fragmentation fostered by philistine culture is more
social in kind. The sheer quantity of history ingested by the educated
barbarian evokes a destabilising sense ‘of the ﬂuidity of all concepts, types
and species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animal’.
Nietzsche describes this view of existence as ‘true but deadly’ (HL 9, p.112).
In his eyes, the disorienting experience of existing in a state of pure ﬂux,
devoid of higher purpose, breeds a pernicious strain of cynicism towards the
world of action (HL 5, p.83). Moreover, this attitude issues in a socially
divisive form of egoistic immoralism as individuals fall back on the one
thing of which they are certain: their own personal life-needs. Needless to
say, once the rapacious pursuit of personal gain becomes the social norm,
the community ‘falls apart [zu Grunde geht] and ceases to be a people [Volk]’
(HL 9, pp.112–113).
In UM, Nietzsche’s general concern with the pathology of disintegration
can therefore be redescribed as a preoccupation with the following triad of
speciﬁc disorders:
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(a) The anarchic discordance of models guiding agency;
(b) The diremption of our interior, intellectual life from our external
comportment, which is consequently governed by convention;
(c) The socially divisive egoism engendered by cynism.
We ought to recall that the evaluative criterion that dominates Nietzsche’s
thought during this period is the extent to which phenomena aid or
obstruct ‘an evolving culture and the procreation of genius – which is the
goal of all culture’ (SE 3, p.358). In their own fashion, each of the aformen-
tioned species of disgregation undercut the social and individual conditions
of coordination that are necessary for genius to arise. In contrast to the
Hegelian belief that modern Germans have already achieved a ‘completion
of world-history’ (HL 8, p.104) or Hartmann’s whiggish conviction that pro-
gress is guaranteed by an automatic ‘world-process’ (Weltprozess) (HL 9,
p.107), Nietzsche warns us that the amelioration of our condition is wholly
contingent upon our actively ﬁghting for it: ‘[T]hat ideal condition will not be
created by dreaming, it must be fought and struggled for’ (HL 9, p.111;
emphasis added). We should now inquire into how Nietzsche thinks this
ﬁght can best be fought.
2. Incorporation and eradication: the twofold path to
organisation
As we will presently see, Nietzsche volunteers a number of intertwined
solutions to the three forms of disunity delineated in the previous section.
One of the key ways that these remedies are related is in their paradigmatic
appropriation of Schopenhauer’s conception of healthy purposive organisa-
tion. Accordingly, we should commence by reconstructing Schopenhauer’s
position.10
Schopenhauer inherits his concern with purposive organisation
(Zweckmäßigkeit) from Kant, whose most lucid treatment of the topic is to
be found in his Critique of Judgement. Here Kant asks how we can explain
the existence of self-organising beings – that is, organisms – in which
interdependent parts ﬁt together to harmoniously serve the interests of
the whole (what Kant calls inner purposiveness). Kant further asks how we
can explain the harmonious holism of nature: how is it that all the world’s
ﬂora and fauna mutually support one another (as is evidenced by food
chains)? And how is it that all of this taken together serves to support
rational human culture, which stands at the apex of this grand system
(what Kant calls outer purposiveness)?11 Since the interdependence of
such parts means that they could not have independently pre-existed the
wholes to which they belong, Kant argues that we simply cannot conceive
of how either outer or inner purposiveness could arise in a purely
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mechanistic universe by force of sheer coincidence.12 Kant’s response is to
suggest that we are forced to make recourse to the concept of teleological
causality as a principle of reﬂective judgement – that is to say, failing a
better explanation, we must provisionally think ‘as if’ such phenomena were
the product of intelligent design (2007, §75).
Schopenhauer, by contrast, arrives at a more dogmatic conclusion –
namely, that purposiveness can only be explained by the fact that the
unity of an entity has its ground in the substantial unity of its Platonic
Idea, the timeless prototype that determines the development of all
individual instantiations of any given natural kind.13 Schopenhauer
describes these Ideas as being engaged in an unrelenting zero-sum
struggle over matter, which they require in order to become fully man-
ifest phenomena; indeed, ‘each only has what it has torn away from
another’ (WWR I, 335).
This ‘universal struggle [Kampf]’ (WWR I, 172) is then, for
Schopenhauer, the turbulent matrix out of which ever higher Ideas
enter the world – a process culminating in man, whom he dubs the
‘clearest and most perfect objectivation’ of the noumenal world-will
(WWR I, 178). Yet, in order for the Idea of man to become manifest,
Schopenhauer asserts that it must be ‘accompanied by the stepwise
descent through all animal forms, through the plant kingdom, and
down to the inorganic’ (ibid.). The reason that man, the ultimate end of
nature, needs the existence of this complete, internally conﬂictual system
in order to emerge is that it is precisely this system that provides him
with the materials required for his survival.
Whereas outer purposiveness supervenes on the conﬂictual relations
between individual phenomena, Schopenhauer theorises that the inner
purposiveness of organisms emerges from the conﬂict within individual
phenomena. Every organism, aside from being constituted by a single
idea, supervenes on a hierarchy of Ideas (e.g., organs, cells, molecules,
atoms, etc.). Higher Ideas are only able to prevail in the aforementioned
universal struggle by pressing lower Ideas into the service of their higher
purpose. Schopenhauer illustrates this by adducing the example of the
human body’s struggle to control its humours, as well as its ﬁght to digest
and utilize organic matter.
The appearance of a higher Idea will emerge from this conﬂict [Streit] and
overpower all the less perfect Ideas that were there before, in such a way that
it lets their essence continue to exist in a subordinate manner by taking an
analogue of them into itself. (WWR I, 169)
This exploitative, instrumentalising struggle to establish hierarchical rela-
tions represents the constitutive ground of every phenomenon: ‘No victory
without a struggle: since the higher Idea or objectivation of the will can
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come forward only by overpowering the lower Ideas, it encounters resis-
tance on their part’ (WWR I, 170). Like Kant, Schopenhauer rejects the claim
that we can explain organismic unity with reference to exclusively mechan-
ical laws. But diverging from his predecessor, Schopenhauer dogmatically
asserts that the only adequate explanation is that Ideas are engaged in this
mutual struggle for ‘overwhelming assimilation [Assimilation]’ (ibid.).
What is more, on Schopenhauer’s account, once lower ideas have been co-
opted, conﬂict nonetheless persists insofar as subjugated Ideas are constantly
struggling to reassert their independence. He thus deﬁnes health (Gesundheit)
as an organism’s ability to subdue this rebellious conﬂict and keep lower Ideas
subordinated to its higher purpose (WWR I, 171). Death often results from the
inevitable success of the lower Ideas in their perpetual struggle for indepen-
dence, which results in the disintegration of the organism. But destructive
struggle is also necessitated by the fact that Ideas can onlymanifest themselves
by means of consuming other ideas and thereby commandeering the matter
and subordinate Ideas out of which the vanquished were composed. Just as a
victor in battle might sack and enslave a defeated city, the victorious Idea
disbands the opposed organisation and instrumentalises the Ideas previously
organised therein; hence, ‘every animal can maintain itself in being only by
constantly destroying another’ (WWR I, 172; see also 335).
On the basis of this analysis, we can attribute the following deﬁning
criteria to Schopenhauer’s model of assimilative struggle:
(1) Within it, opposed relata (Ideas) are aimed at subjugating their coun-
terparts into an instrumental hierarchy.
(2) Its telos, instrumental hierarchy, is associated with health.
(3) It is conditioned by destructive struggle – that is, the forced dissolution
of existing unities, which enables the seizure of their constituent parts.
(4) It continues within the aforementioned instrumental hierarchies even
once these have been established.
In terms of its structure, this struggle of higher versus lower Ideas has
remarkably little in common with the agonal contest described in HC –
namely, on account of its being characterised by inequality, instrumentalisa-
tion and, despite its measured aim of subjugation, being conditioned by
destructive struggle. Let us now examine how this model informs
Nietzsche’s prescriptions in UM.
2.1. Plastic power
Surveying other texts from the period during which Nietzsche was writing
UM, we ﬁnd strong evidence that he was well acquainted with, and even
assented to, Schopenhauer’s description of the world as a universal struggle
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for purposive organisation.14 Reinforcing the idea that Nietzsche avowed his
predecessor’s conﬂict-based conception of organisation, we also ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant parallelism between this conception and the struggle for unity
that Nietzsche promotes in HL.
Despite Nietzsche’s critique of over-education, and speciﬁcally the over-
accumulation of historical knowledge, it should be underscored that he none-
theless posits such knowledge as a necessary condition of health. As he
emphatically remarks: ‘[T]he unhistorical and the historical are necessary in
equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture’
(HL 1, p.63). But how can historical knowledge redress the problematic disin-
tegration to which its excess gave rise in the ﬁrst place?
Nietzsche tells us that man is simply unable to survive without distorting
and exploiting the past in accordance with his needs. Reverberating with
Schopenhauer’s account of assimilation, he describes this process of press-
ing history into the service of one’s life-needs as one of incorporation
(Einverleibung):
The stronger the innermost roots of a man’s nature, the more readily will he be
able to assimilate and appropriate the things of the past; and the most powerful
and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know
no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would
draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most
foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood. (HL 1, pp.62–3)
The ability to exploit history in order ‘to transform and incorporate into oneself
what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to
recreate broken moulds’ is what Nietzsche refers to as ‘the plastic power [Kraft]
of a man, a people, a culture’ (HL 1, p.62). He takes the pre-Socratic Greeks to
have exempliﬁed this ability: they drew together their knowledge of foreign
cultures and applied it to their real needs (ächte Bedürfnisse).15 Their awareness
of their authentic needs endowed the Greeks with a standard according to
which the tumult of foreign inﬂuences could be regimented: ‘The Greeks
gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the Delphic teaching
and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real needs, and letting their
pseudo-needs die out’ (HL 10, p.122).
Nietzsche recommends that exemplars from past or foreign cultures – that
is, models and standards for aesthetic and ethical agency – should only be
maintained and taught to subsequent generations if they can be implemented
as expedients in the face of current obstacles. Accordingly, that which a vibrant
individual or culture ‘cannot subdue it knows how to forget’ (HL 1, p.63).
Forgetfulness, which represents the counter-dynamic of incorporation, is
what Nietzsche dubs the ‘unhistorical’ mode of existence (ibid.). At a stroke,
this strategy promises to resolve both (a) and (b). First, by implementing
utilisable knowledge, and forgetting redundant knowledge, a combination of
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inﬂuences is fashioned that is tailored to one’s true aesthetic and ethical
needs. Second, in applying one’s knowledge, one reconnects one’s inner life
(of knowledge and belief) with one’s external existence (in praxis).
It should be clear from this analysis that the conﬂictual relation Nietzsche
encourages us to take towards foreign and past cultural inﬂuences cannot
justiﬁably be described as agonal. The primary reason for this is that the
struggle is largely depicted as being motivated by the goal of instrumenta-
lisation. As Vanessa Lemm (2013, 6) has tellingly put it, according to
Nietzsche’s ideal, ‘the human being appropriates, dominates and rules
over the past’.
Herman Siemens has observed that the dynamic of incorporation deli-
neated in HL bears a striking resemblance to the process of ‘transposition’
(Übertragung) that is depicted in HC – that is, the process by which the
Greeks harnessed their ordinarily destructive and bellicose drives for strug-
gle and victory by channelling them into, and granting them release
through, culturally productive agonal contest. On these grounds, Siemens
(2001a, 101) holds the incorporative struggle described in HL to be an
agonal mode of conﬂict:
The key to Nietzsche’s thought here is a notion of productive and inclusive
conﬂict that he derives from the signature institution of pre-Socratic culture:
the contest or agon (Wettkampf). It is through a transformative assimilation –
or Übertragung – of natural, destructive drives that the agon was born.
However, the fact that the agon emerges out of a form of assimilative struggle
is not enough to justify labelling that originary struggle agonal (indeed, to
claim otherwise would be to commit a genetic fallacy). Nor is the fact that the
resultant organisation is productive a suﬃcient condition for categorising
such assimilative struggle as agonal in kind. To be sure, the struggle to
incorporate implementable phenomena is, like the agon, a non-destructive
and culturally productive mode of conﬂict; yet as was determined in our
introduction, the agon is not motivated by the desire to instrumentally
command one’s opponent, as is the case with assimilative struggle. Agonal
and assimilative conﬂict are sui generismodes of struggle that we should take
care not to conﬂate.
Another way that HL resists agonistic readings is in its persistent valorisa-
tion of unmeasured conﬂict. As we have just witnessed, Nietzsche exhorts us
to forget expendable knowledge and let our ‘pseudo-needs’ die out, thereby
ridding ourselves of their harmful inﬂuence. The organisational struggle that
Nietzsche propounds is therefore deﬁned by both the struggle to include
useful knowledge within the horizon of one’s true needs and the ﬁght to
conclusively exclude redundant knowledge and needs from that same hor-
izon. Furthermore, this latter struggle is not one that aims to maintain a
conﬂictual relation with that which has been excluded; rather, complete
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annihilation is its telos – any excluded or forgotten datum of knowledge ‘no
longer exists, the horizon is rounded and closed’ (HL 1, p.63; emphasis
added). It should be added that while this process of elimination recalls
the exclusive practice of ostracism described in HC, this does not warrant
our calling it agonal. First, to my mind, the eliminatory species of struggle
denoted by ostracism should not itself be understood as agonal; rather
ostracism stands as a non-agonal safeguard of agonal contest and should
not be confounded with the type of conﬂict that it ensures. Second, in HC,
ostracism functions as a fall-back measure that is only called upon in the
event that other sources of moderation fail (e.g. the mutual limitation that
approximately equal contestants impose upon one another), and such fail-
ure is by no means inevitable.16 As such, ostracism is not a necessary
component of agonal culture in the same way that eliminatory stuggle is
with respect to the dynamic of organisational conﬂict.
At the end of HL, Nietzsche reiterates this aﬃrmation of unmeasured
struggle in petitioning the ‘youth’, ‘that ﬁrst generation of ﬁghters and
dragon-slayers’, to execute the urgent task set forth in the body of the
essay. In dubbing them ‘dragon-slayers’ and defending their right to ‘coar-
seness and immoderation [Unmässigkeit]’ (HL 10, p.121), he makes it quite
transparent that he is campaigning for anything but a measured, agonal
mode of conﬂict. This is a struggle to destroy (zerstören) the beliefs that
block the project of cultural renewal, principally by provoking ‘mockery and
hatred’ towards them (ibid.) – that is, through a process of devaluation or
radical critique. What distinguishes the forms of unmeasured conﬂict that
Nietzsche advocates from those that he so often rebukes as culturally
injurious – for example, the struggle-to-the-death (Vernichtungskampf)
described in HC – is that they promote life and culture by enabling creativity,
agency and individuality. Nietzsche states that the great productive spirit
only aims to condemn (verurtheilen) ‘what to him, as a living being and one
productive of life, is destructive and degrading’ (HL 4, p.82).
We can therefore read Nietzsche’s promotion of organisational struggle
as sharing three key structural features with Schopenhauer’s notion of
assimilative conﬂict:
(1) It is aimed at subjugation (of the various data of knowledge to a
person’s or culture’s true life-needs).
(2) Its telos, instrumental hierarchy, is associated with health.
(3) It is conditioned by destructive struggle (the omission of redundant
knowledge, the radical critique of counterproductive conventions,
and the eradication of pseudo-needs).
One notable diﬀerence, however, is that whereas Schopenhauer merely
describes assimilative conﬂict as a naturally occurring process, Nietzsche’s
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depiction of such conﬂict has a strong normative bent. For Nietzsche, healthy
organisation is contingent on our consciously struggling for it, and he strives
to persuade us that we should engage in just such an endeavour.
We might be tempted to infer that the absence of the fourth criterion of
assimilative conﬂict – that such conﬂict continues within the instrumental
hierarchies that it establishes – is indicative of further divergence; yet, if we
now turn to the question of self-knowledge as it is worked out in the latter
two meditations, we will ﬁnd that this criterion is in fact satisﬁed by
Nietzsche’s broader synthetic project.
2.2. Knowing thyself
Self-knowledge represents a sine qua non of the organisational struggle we
discovered in HL: onemust know one’s true needs in order to synthesise one’s
historical inﬂuences. Such knowledge provides the metric by which one is
able to separate the wheat (which should be incorporated) from the chaﬀ
(which should be jettisoned) – hence Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ‘Delphic
teaching’, that is to say, the maxim: ‘know thyself’ (HL 10, pp.122–123). In a
manner that is germane to our current inquiry, self-knowledge is similarly
fundamental within Schopenhauer’s account of subjective organisation.
Indeed, the conception of self-organisation that Nietzsche develops in the
latter two meditations, though especially in SE, is one that in many ways
mirrors Schopenhauer’s treatment of the issue in WWR.
Each person, says Schopenhauer, possesses their own distinctive character,
their unique ‘complete personality’ (WWR I, 156). Again echoing Kant,
Schopenhauer initially informs us that an individual’s character, or what he
also calls their ‘individual will’ (WWR I, 318), has two sides: one that appears to
us (our empirical character) and one that remains imperceptible (our intelligible
character). Like all objects within the Kantian Weltanschauung, our character is
undetermined to the extent that it exists outside of space and time (qua
intelligible character) as a thing in itself, exempt from the laws of causality.
However, our character appears as our empirical character when we make
decisions and act in the spatio-temporal world of representation.
Nonetheless, it is vital to observe how, for Schopenhauer, each individual’s
character is in essence ﬁxed. Just like each natural kind, every individual’s
character is deﬁned by its own unchangeable Platonic Idea. A person’s char-
acter is accordingly determined at birth (WWR I, 250), and, when presentedwith
a given conﬂict of motives and a given degree of knowledge about how best to
pursue those motives, that person will therefore only ever resolve upon one
particular path. Their behaviour is, according to Schopenhauer, determined
with iron necessity.
Schopenhauer also identiﬁes a third type of character: acquired character.
Man ﬁnds in himself, says Schopenhauer, ‘the tendencies to all the various
12 J. S. PEARSON
human aspirations and abilities’; yet, if we are to proﬁtably follow a directed
line in life instead of running in a ‘zigzag all over the place without getting
anything done’, some impulses ‘must be entirely repressed’. In order to
achieve this, ‘a human being must also know what he is willing, and know
what he can do’ (WWR I, 330). He claims that through successive acts we are
able to glean a progressively more comprehensive picture of our unique
empirical character. Through this knowledge of our empirical character
(particularly of our idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses) we learn which
of these impulses must be suppressed in order to follow the life path most
suited to our aptitudes.
Nietzsche is openly sceptical regarding the ideal of acquired character
that we ﬁnd in Schopenhauer. Indeed, he opens SE by casting doubt on the
very possibility of self-knowledge. Man, he maintains, ‘is a thing dark and
veiled’ who can never say to himself ‘this is really you, this is no longer outer
shell’ (SE 1, p.129). How could we ever be certain that we have obtained
insight into our true needs and capacities and not those that merely appear
so (viz., our pseudo-needs)? What sense does it make to talk of a core,
essential self if it can never be assuredly intuited? Further betraying a desire
to distance himself from essentialist conceptions of the self, Nietzsche
asserts that, although each of us is a ‘Unicum’, we are not uniﬁed in any
substantial sense; rather, echoing Hume’s bundle theory of the self, he
theorises that we are each ‘a so strangely variegated [buntes] multiplicity
[Mancherlei] gathered into a unity [Einerlei]’ (SE 1, p.127; amended
translation).
Yet this should not cause us to omit the strong undercurrent of essenti-
alism running through UM. Throughout SE and ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreath’
(the fourth and ﬁnal medition, hereafter WB), we bear witness to Nietzsche
referring to the self in strikingly essentialist terms. He speaks of the ‘core
[Kern] of [one’s] essence [Wesens]’ (SE 3, p.143; amended translation) and
even simply of a person’s ‘true essence’ (wahres Wesen) (SE 1, p.129;
amended translation). He further acclaims the way in which Schopenhauer
was governed (waltet) by his ‘Platonic Idea [Idee]’ (SE 5, p.156; amended
translation). Finally, he states that our true educators should help us
acknowledge a self that sounds remarkably essentialist in kind: they should
‘reveal to you that the true, original meaning and basic stuﬀ of your nature is
something completely incapable of being educated or formed [Unerziehbares
und Unbildbares] [. . .]’ (SE 1, p.129).17
What is more, despite his reservations regarding the possibility of self-
knowledge, Nietzsche nonetheless follows Schopenhauer in regarding
knowledge of our authentic self as a condition of self-organisation. This is
most clearly evident in the following passage:
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[W]hat have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what
has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects
before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law,
the fundamental law of your own true self: Compare these objects one with
another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transﬁgures another,
how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to
yourself as you are now [. . .]. (SE 1, p.129)
Nietzsche’s hypothesis is that recollecting and comparing our highest joys
reveals an inner law that describes the ideal trajectory of our self-
development, and that this endows us with a conception of our higher
self towards which we can aim. Note that, in contrast to Schopenhauer’s
conception of empirical character, this ﬁxed inner law is one that directs a
continual process of development – it never describes us as we are. We might
think of it as being analogous to the algebraic formula that describes the
pattern in an existing series. Such a formula, while lacking any determinate
content of its own, nonetheless allows us to deduce how the series should
continue for higher values.
The discovery of this inner trajectory is of interest to Nietzsche because,
recalling HL, such self-knowledge forms the basis for organising the self into
a ‘harmonious whole’ (SE 2, p.131). It enables one to become someone
inwhom everything, knowledge, desire, love, hate, strives towards a central point,
a root force, andwhere through the compelling and commanding supremacy [die
zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt] of this living centre, a harmonious
system is constructed here and there, above and below. (SE 2, p.131; amended
translation)
This idea is also apparent in Nietzsche’s description of Wagner in WB, whom
he praises for the ‘severity and uniformity of purpose he imposed upon his
will’ (WB 9, p.244):
[F]rom the moment when his ruling passion became aware of itself and took his
whole nature in its charge [. . .] there was an end to fumbling, straying, to the
proliferation of secondary shoots, and within the most convoluted courses and
often daring trajectories assumed by his artistic plans there rules a single inner
law [Gesetzlichkeit], a will, by which they can be explained [. . .]. (WB 2, p.200)
Once the ideal trajectory of our self has been deduced, or becomes ‘aware
of itself’, it functions as what Nietzsche describes as a ‘root’ or ‘cardinal
force’, that is, a ‘middle-point’ under and around which all our other capa-
cities can be organised.18 In accordance with Schopenhauer’s account of
acquired character, ascertaining our calling in life is said to give us the
fundamental criterion we need in order to synthesise our ‘knowledge,
desire, love, hate’ into a stable and coherent structure. This holism is
attained by determining how every other subjective force can serve this
authentic calling and then ordering these forces accordingly.19 We should
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also call attention to the fact that Nietzsche not only construes this central
point as the cornerstone or fulcrum of self-organisation but, additionally, as
the organising force itself.
There is unfortunately not space to satisfyingly explore Nietzsche’s con-
ception of the true self in UM, which, as I have indicated, is envisioned in a
number of diﬀerent ways (viz., a quasi-Schopenhauerian Idea, a quasi-
Humean bundle, and a quasi-Aristotelian developmental law). Nietzsche
undoubtedly vacillates over this issue, as he does vis-à-vis the possibility
of self-knowledge. Determining his ambiguous relation to Schopenhauer’s
essentialism in UM, however, is not necessary with respect to our principal
objective: illuminating the unagonistic impetus of the text. It suﬃces to
remark that Nietzsche consistently posits the existence of a deeper part of
the self that he believes ought to govern the remainder of the self in a
stably centralised manner. This is problematic for agonistic readings of UM
for two reasons. Firstly, because the struggle for self-governance that
Nietzsche is promoting is unambiguously directed at the instrumentalisation
of the serviceable forces of the self. Secondly, the notion of a ‘living centre’
enduringly reigning over the hierarchy of the self is profoundly at odds with
the ﬂuid pluralism of approximately equal powers that characterises
Nietzsche’s agonism. In HC, his idealised agonal community is deﬁned by
decentred constellations of mutually limiting forces – what Nietzsche calls
the ‘contest of powers’ [Wettspiel der Kräfte]) – and where any hegemon is
forcibly removed by means of ostracism (HC, 98). Note that these points,
aside from controverting the agonistic approach, also positively vindicate
the idea that we should read UM in terms of the exploitative struggle for
assimilation described by Schopenhauer.
But there are yet further reasons that we might favour this
Schopenhauerian interpretive framework. For Nietzsche, the struggle for
purposive organisation does not only involve the measured, inclusive process
of coordinating our inclinations into a functional hierarchy; rather, this pro-
cess is necessarily accompanied by an unmeasured struggle of eradication, for
‘the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the
tender buds’ of a burgeoning culture (SE 1, p.130). Nietzsche’s sights are set
on the dross conventions that hinder the fruition of genius. Indeed, he argues
that Schopenhauer only assailed ‘those aspects of his age that prevent[ed]
him from being great’, with the speciﬁc aim of recovering ‘the health and
purity native to him’ (SE 3, pp.145–6). Once again, note that what are being
destroyed (zerstört) are, according to Nietzsche, doxai, and how they are being
destroyed is by means of radical critique, or denial (Verneinung) (SE 4, p.151).
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche sees the discovery of our inner self as a
source of purposiveness and increased eﬃcacy; yet, whereas Schopenhauer
merely emphasises the way this revelation provides the basis necessary for
suppressing (unterdrücken) diverting impulses, Nietzsche accents how it can
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act as an Archimedean point around which our forces can be synthesised
and stimulated. The ideal educator, says Nietzsche, should not just engender
the harmonious ordering of their pupil around a dominant ‘central root’, but
they should also ‘foster and nourish all available forces’ (SE 2, p.130;
amended translation). Only wholly recalcitrant impulses should be eradi-
cated on Nietzsche’s account. As such, the ordering Nietzsche seeks is not
one that simply forces our inclinations into passive submission to our core
selves; this order is rather the very means by which subaltern forces can be
fomented and held in ever greater degrees of tension with one another.20
We should therefore not construe this dominating centre as having an
exclusively suppressant eﬀect on the forces harmonised beneath it. Rather,
it maximises their mutual conﬂict, while constantly struggling to keep this
contention within beneﬁcial limits. With this, we can aﬃrm that the struggle
proposed by Nietzsche as a solution to individual disintegration fulﬁls the
ﬁnal criterion of Schopenhauer’s model of assimilative struggle – namely,
that such struggle continues within the instrumental hierarchies that it
establishes (4).
2.3. Common purpose
We have so far been concerned with mapping out Nietzsche’s prescribed
remedies for individual disintegration. What remains to be seen, however, is
how he proposes we counteract disintegration at the level of the collective. To
be sure, Nietzsche is at pains to show us that acknowledging our need to strive
for our higher (integrated) self imposes duties upon us that
are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in the midst of a
mighty community held together, not by external forms and regulations, but by
a fundamental idea [emphasis added]. It is the fundamental idea of culture,
insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of
the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to
work at the perfecting of nature. (SE 5, p.160)
For Nietzsche, collectively acknowledging our duty to engender genius therefore
functions as the primary foundation for social organisation.Whatwenowneed to
determine, however, iswhetherwe can categorise this collective struggle– that is,
the ‘struggle for culture’ (Kampf für die Kultur) (SE 6, p.163; amended translation) –
as agonistic.
In trying to elucidate the kind of struggle Nietzsche has in mind here, we
should begin by underlining the deep equivocation in how he conceives of
genius, which constitutes the goal of his cultural program. On the one hand, he
adopts theKantianunderstandingof genius as a ‘talent’ (Talent, Naturgabe) or ‘the
innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’
(Kant 2007, 136). Needless to say, on this conception, the talent characteristic of
16 J. S. PEARSON
genius is only enjoyed by a minority of innately gifted individuals. This is what I
will call elite genius. Aristocratic readers such as Rawls have argued that Nietzsche
exclusively promotes this form of genius in SE. Rawls (1971, 325) reads SE as
stating that ‘it is the sole principle of a teleological theory directing society to
arrange institutions and todeﬁne theduties andobligations of individuals so as to
maximise the achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture.’21 On
this interpretation of Nietzsche’s perfectionism, the majority of individuals must
sacriﬁce their personal self-development for the sake of cultivating a minority of
elite geniuses. And certainly, there are passages that unmistakably support this
interpretation – for instance, where Nietzsche asks the reader the following: ‘[H]
ow can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest
signiﬁcance? [. . .] Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and
most valuable exemplars, and not for the good of the majority’ (SE 6, p.162).
On the other hand, alongside this, following Romantics such as Byron
and Emerson, Nietzsche also employs a more global conception of genius
qua the capacity for originality and authenticity, which inheres in every-
one, without exception. Thus, Emerson (1870, 188) proclaims to all of his
readers that ‘Genius is the power to labor better [. . .]. Deserve thy genius;
exalt it.’ This is what I will refer to as the global conception of genius.
Cavell, and following in his wake, James Conant, both reject Rawls’
reading by contending that Nietzsche prioritises the cultivation of this
type of genius: ‘[T]he “something higher and more human” in question is
not [. . .] that of someone else, but a further or eventual position of the
self now dissatisﬁed with itself’ (Cavell 1990; 52; see also Conant 2001;
203). And to be sure, we can also adduce passages from SE that seem to
substantiate this reading – for example, where Nietzsche states that
‘culture is the child of each individual’s self-knowledge and dissatisfaction
with himself’ (SE 6, p.162; emphasis added).
What, then, is the one goal that is meant to be binding us together,
and for which we are meant to be striving – the cultivation of my global
genius or the cultivation of others’ elite genius? In fact, as we will now
see, Nietzsche views these as mutually complementary undertakings –
the cultivation of genius ‘outside us’ and ‘within us’ represent ‘one task’
(SE 5, p.160).
In the ﬁnal sections of SE, Nietzsche proﬀers two arguments for why we
ought to endeavour to cultivate the elite genius of others. The ﬁrst argument
requires little more than the realisation that we must each strive to become
elite geniuses ourselves. According to this line of reasoning, he suggests that
it is in our own personal interest, as aspiring elite geniuses, to create a social
environment that fosters this type of genius in others. First, because our
personal struggle to achieve elite genius demands the aid of other elite
geniuses. We need exemplars to illuminate, and spur us towards, higher
goals – ‘we have to be lifted up’ (SE 5, p.159). Second, in fashioning an
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environment in which elite geniuses are able to achieve their highest poten-
tial, Nietzsche thinks that we simultaneously create an environment in which
we can independently strive to attain our highest potential. In struggling
against the social forces that prevent elite geniuses such as Schopenhauer
from emerging, we also ‘unwearyingly combat [ankämpfen] that which would
deprive us of the supreme fulﬁlment of our existence by preventing us from
becoming such Schopenhauerian men ourselves’ (SE 5, p.160). This implies a
fairly straightforward compatibility of egoistic and collective goals.
But what about those individuals who know themselves to be wholly
incapable of attaining the heights of elite genius – ‘second and third rate
talents’ as Nietzsche calls them (SE 6, p.176)? How can he persuade such
individuals, who might quite reasonably take their egoistic interests to be
incompatible with those of the elite genius, to devote themselves to this
higher, cultural goal?
In order to convince such middling types, Nietzsche declares that gen-
erating elite genius represents the highest end of nature, and thus it is only in
collectively pursuing this end that the mediocre can realise their highest
calling. Otherwise put: it is only in contributing to the procreation of elite
genius that the majority can maximise their own global genius. Nietzsche’s
argument hinges on the supposition that ‘[n]ature needs knowledge’ in
order to attain redemption (Erlösung) (SE 5, pp.158–9), and it can only attain
this by means of the elite genius, who therefore constitutes nature’s highest
goal. Although elucidating this rather esoteric claim, which is based on an
admixture of Hegel, Kant and Schopenhauer, would undoubtedly be enligh-
tening, doing so would cause us to digress from our main line of inquiry.
What is worth mentioning, however, is that Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer
in viewing nature as vainly pressing towards its goals. In WWR, this concep-
tion of nature is perhaps most conspicuously presented in Schopenhauer’s
vision of the artistic genius:
[A]ctual objects are almost always very deﬁcient exemplars of the Idea pre-
sented in them: hence the genius needs imagination [Phantasie] in order to
see in things not what nature actually created, but rather what it was trying
unsuccessfully to create, a failure due to that struggle between its forms [. . .].
(WWR I, 210; emphasis added)
In an analogous manner, Nietzsche considers nature to be incapable of achiev-
ing its goal of producing ideal humans (i.e. elite geniuses) unaided: we see
‘nature pressing towards man and again and again failing to achieve him’ (SE 6,
p.163). Consequently, he deems it necessary ‘to replace that “obscure impulse”
with a conscious willing’ (SE 6, p.164). This is what he describes as the ‘meta-
physical signiﬁcance [Bedeutung] of culture’ (SE 6, p.175). Culture’s true raison
d’être is to expedite nature’s otherwise futile eﬀorts at realising genius: ‘[E]
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verything calls to us: come, assist, complete, bring together what belongs
together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole’ (SE 6, p.163).
This argument can therefore be summarised as follows: given that nat-
ure’s highest goal is the production of elite genius, it is our goal to assist
nature in achieving this, even if we are without hope of becoming elite
geniuses ourselves. Contrary to Cavell’s interpretation, Nietzsche demands
the sacriﬁce of our egoistic goals for the sake of elite geniuses – that is, ‘on
behalf of another individual [Einzelner]’ (SE 6, p.162; emphasis added).22
Crucially, this gives us further cause to reject agonistic readings insofar as
the social order that Nietzsche is striving to realise with such arguments is
one unquestionably characterised by entrenched inequality and instrumen-
tal relations. Yet, we must take care not to misinterpret the nature of this
instrumentalisation. Contrary to Rawls’s reading, it is not conceived as an
oppressive social arrangement. Instead, Nietzsche stresses that lesser indivi-
duals stand to gain by acquiescing to their metaphysical duty, since it is only
in so doing that their lives come to ‘possess signiﬁcance and a goal’ (SE 6,
p.176).23 It is only by voluntarily serving elite genius that we realise nature’s
highest purpose and, thereby, our own highest capacities. In striving to fulﬁl
this external end, we therefore concurrently work towards maximising our
own inner, global genius.24
It should by now be apparent that neither the reading of Rawls nor that of
Cavell stand up to scrutiny – the entire either/or approach is misguided.
Both err in assuming that Nietzsche is operating with one or the other of the
aforementioned deﬁnitions of genius. In actuality, he invokes both concep-
tions, and, furthermore, argues that when taken as cultural goals, they are
even mutually complementary.
In formulating these collective ends, Nietzsche proves himself to be
fulﬁlling what he designates as the ideal cohesive function of the philo-
sopher qua ‘physician of culture’: to ‘bind everyone through a common
goal [Ziel]’ (WEN, 187; KSA 7:30[8], 734; see also KSA 7:30[7], 732).
Nonetheless, it should be restated that Nietzsche principally strives to
establish this cohesion by cajoling large swathes of society into an
enduring position of subservience.25 This is pertinent because it is on
these grounds that we can rebut agonistic conceptions of Nietzsche’s
struggle for culture in SE.
As we turn to some of Nietzsche’s more concrete recommendations as to
how we might achieve cultural renewal, we unearth yet more obstacles to the
agonistic approach, and, simultaneously, further support for our
Schopenhauerian reading. First, Nietzsche quite minimally calls for the creation
of a sequestered social space for cultivating elite geniuses, one shielded from all
demands extraneous to this goal, be they the needs of the economically or
politically powerful, or even the elite genius’s own survival needs (she should
have ‘no necessity for bread-winning’) (SE 8, p.182). Nietzsche commends the
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‘small band’ who view cultural institutions as a bulwark (Schutzwehr) shielding
elite geniuses from the vulgar utilitarian demands of society (SE 6, p.176).26
With respect to philosophical genius, one way that Nietzsche envisions this
being realised is through the complete purgation of philosophy from the
university system, which, he tells us, has rendered the discipline ridiculous by
allowing it to be subordinated to the ends of the state. It is therefore a ‘demand
of culture that philosophy should be deprived of any kind of oﬃcial or aca-
demic recognition [. . .]. Let the philosophers grow untended’ (SE 8, p.190). In
this way, Nietzsche incites his readers to a quite unagonistic ﬁght for the
complete abolition of academic philosophy.
Nietzsche’s struggle for culture is indissociable from a ‘hostility towards
those inﬂuences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize
his goal [Ziel]: the production of the genius’ (SE 6, p.163; amended
translation). Yet, as we have just seen, this hostility is deﬁnitely not wholly
measured in kind. Indeed, Nietzsche applauds Wagner for acknowledging
the fact that ‘the genius must not fear to enter into the most hostile
relationship [feindseligsten Widerspruch] with the existing forms and order’
(SE 3, p.137). This resistance is strikingly described as superlatively hostile
towards cultural orders that stymie the generation of genius. Given this
endorsement of immoderate hostility, we can once again see how mis-
representative it is to refer to Nietzsche’s proposed ‘struggle for culture’
as an agon of individuals against society.27
This initial act of purgation must then be followed, Nietzsche instructs
us, by a process of ‘continual puriﬁcation [Läuterung]’, whereby any
encroachment of extraneous demands into the cultural refuge of the
elite genius is promptly thwarted (SE 6, p.176). Even once the necessary
social hierarchy has been erected, then, the battle is not over; indeed, it is
never over. The struggle for culture is a relentless endeavour to maintain
this ideal hierarchy by combatting social structures that are inimical to the
elite genius.28
With this aﬃrmation of perpetual strife as a necessary condition of
purposive social organisation we can now soundly conclude that
Nietzsche’s struggle for culture, in addition to being incompatible with
his notion of agonal conﬂict, positively instantiates the key structural
features of Schopenhauer’s model of assimilative struggle. Analogous
with Schopenhauer’s model, we can therefore state the following about
the kind of cultural contention that Nietzsche advocates in UM: 1. it is
directed towards instrumental hierarchy (with the majority serving the
needs of elite genius); 2. the hierarchy for which it strives is associated
with (cultural) health; 3. it is inextricable from unmeasured conﬂict
(towards social conventions that hamper elite genius); and 4. the struggle
persists within the resultant hierarchies (as a struggle to maintain this
hierarchy through ‘continual puriﬁcation’).
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Conclusion
We now have a comprehensive picture of Nietzsche’s remedies for the three
pathological forms of disintegration that we enumerated in Section 1.
Against the self-fragmentation that hindered agency (a), we found him
recommending an unagonistic struggle to instrumentalise the utilisable
knowledge, habits and values that we have acquired from other cultures.
By subordinating these to our true life-needs, we form them into an inte-
grated whole which is able to facilitate agency. On the other hand, he
enjoins us to eliminate redundant cultural inﬂuences, that is to say, those
that do not serve our life-needs. It is then through this very same dual
struggle that he thinks we can resolve the pathological diremption of our
inner and outer life (b). By forging the myriad of habits, beliefs and values
that an excess of learning has encumbered us with into a coherent unity
dominated by our life-needs, these internal psychological inﬂuences on our
agency thereby become externally applicable in our quotidian practical life.
Finally, with respect to the social division Nietzsche associates with cynical
egoism (c), he recommends collective subscription to the metaphysically
grounded goal of cultivating elite genius.
Although this assimilative struggle can be considered measured insofar
as it aims to preserve that which is deemed useful, we have also seen
Nietzsche persistently emphasising the need for unmeasured conﬂict, that
is to say, the ferociously hostile struggle against those habits, opinions,
traditions and institutions that impede the task of self- and social-
uniﬁcation. Measured incorporation and unmeasured eradication are two
dimensions of a single dynamic that has coordination as its end – hence
my treating both processes under the rubric of organisational struggle. In
misconstruing Nietzsche’s prescriptions in UM as agonistic in kind, pre-
vious commentators have tended to overlook the value that he identiﬁes
in hierarchical organisation, instrumentalisation and eradication. Given the
risk of such oversight, we should therefore exercise caution before analys-
ing Nietzsche’s wider philosophy through the interpretive prism of HC.
The secondary objective of this study was to illuminate the signiﬁcant
structuring inﬂuence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche’s thought in UM. It
should now be beyond reasonable doubt that, in UM at any rate,
Nietzsche paradigmatically deploys a Schopenhauerian notion of healthy,
purposive organisation. Notwithstanding, we should not mistake this
structuring inﬂuence for a wholesale avowal of Schopenhauer’s position.
Indeed, we have seen Nietzsche signiﬁcantly modifying various aspects of
Schopenhauer’s account of purposive organisation. For example, he gives
Schopenhauer’s purely descriptive treatment of organisation a strongly
normative dimension, urging us to conceive of healthy unity as an
accomplishment contingent on our conscious eﬀorts. Moreover, we
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found Nietzsche repeatedly striving to de-essentialise Schopenhauer’s
notion of character. These observations, however, should not cause us
to forget the numerous moments we uncovered where Nietzsche refers to
both the self and nature in markedly Schopenhauerian, metaphysical
terms – terms that he unequivocally disowns during the middle and
late phases of his philosophy. To this extent, UM should be read as a
transitional work in which Nietzsche can be seen vacillating over his
Schopenhauerian heritage. The ironic consequence of this is that UM, a
text that places such a high value on concord, exhibits a remarkable
degree of discord in its stance towards Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
Notes
1. Throughout this paper, I will be using the following abbreviations for
Nietzsche’s writings:
DS:‘David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer’ (Nietzsche 1997a).
EH:Ecce Homo (Nietzsche 2007).
HC:‘Homer’s Contest’ (Nietzsche 2006).
HL:‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ (Nietzsche 1997b).
KSA:Kritische Studienausgabe (Nietzsche 1988). References refer to volume
number, notebook, fragment and page number (in that order). Thus, KSA,
7:30[8], 734 refers to Volume 7, Notebook 30, Fragment 8, page 734.
PTG:Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (Nietzsche 1998).
SE:‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (1997d).
UM:Untimely Meditations (1997e).
WB:‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’ (Nietzsche 1997c).
WEN: Writings from the Early Notebooks (Nietzsche 2009).
2. For commentators who suggest this in the context of Nietzsche’s social philosophy,
see Acampora (2006). In her treatment of the agon, Acampora emphasises how, for
Nietzsche, ‘competitive relations serve as an organising force of culture by bringing
together diverse elements [and] coordinating heterogeneous interests’ (327).
Tuncel (2013) has defended a similar position (see ch.6). We can also situate
agonistic democrat interpretations of Nietzsche in this group – e.g., the work of
Lawrence Hatab, William Connolly, David Owen andMarkWarren, all of whom read
Nietzsche as proposing agonism as a socially cohesive principle.
For commentators who describe Nietzsche’s vision of the healthy self as one that
is agonally organised, see e.g., Gemes (2009, 56 [fn.21] and 49–52). Gemes repeat-
edly refers to Nietzsche’s normative vision of an ‘agonal struggle between drives’.
See also Richardson (1996, 30).
3. For a comprehensive analysis of how this measure is concretely realised, see
Pearson (2018a).
4. We should bear in mind, though, that the psychological conceptions of healthy
agonal struggle that Richardson (1996) and Gemes (2009) respectively develop out
of Nietzsche’s thought involve a master drive’s non-destructive struggle for the
domination of weaker drives. While I would argue that this constitutes a misuse of
Nietzsche’s notion of agon, it nonetheless shows that there are models of
Nietzschean agonism that do not presuppose that such contest takes place inter
pares. This said, insofar as this conﬂict is still ﬁgured by both Gemes and Richardson
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as non-eliminative in nature, this paper will still be rejecting their interpretations of
Nietzsche’s ideal. See Gemes (2009) and Richardson (1996, 33). Similarly, Tuncel
(2013) also puts forward a model of agonal contest at a social level that involves
someminimal notion of hierarchy and servitude: ‘theweak have to serve the strong;
the losing contestants must accept their defeat and look up to the strong’ (173). I
would again contend that this conception of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘agonism’ takes
us too far from the letter of his own usage, which, on the whole, does not permit of
instrumental hierarchy.
5. For example, Acampora (2013, 39) has alleged that HL ‘draws on and extends the
agonistic model he earlier describes [in HC].’ See Acampora (2013, 36–42). See also
Siemens (2001a), 80–106. Vanessa Lemm (2007, 14) reads SE as endorsing ‘a public
struggle (agon) between the individual and society’.
6. Schopenhauer (2011).
7. See Cavell (1990, 53). Conant (2001) echoes this claim.
8. See e.g., Hill (2003, 75).
9. See also HL 5, p.84.
10. The following reconstruction of Schopenhauer's metaphysics builds upon that
which I put forward in Pearson (2018b).
11. See e.g., Kant (2007, §63, §67).
12. As Kant (2007, §66 [376]) categorically states with respect to organisms.
13. Julian Young (2006, 129-33) has persuasively argued that Schopenhauer’s
understanding of Ideas cannot be equated with that of Plato since
Schopenhauer does not reify Ideas.
14. See e.g., PTG, 56.
15. Nietzsche asserts the following in PTG: ‘Whatever [the Greeks] learned they
wanted to live through, immediately’ (31).
16. That ostracism functions as a fall-back moderating mechanism has been
observed by Siemens 2001b, 521).
17. Other commentators have also argued that Nietzsche holds an essentialist
conception of the self in UM. See Miner (2011, 339ﬀ.).
18. See KSA 7:30[9], 734: ‘Harmony is present when everything is related to a
middle point, a cardinal force, not when numerous weak forces simultaneously
play with one another.’
19. Although it is my contention that Nietzsche presents self-organisation as a
conscious process in UM, this is a position that he explicitly rejects in later
texts. See e.g., EH 9. Some, such as Gemes (2009), read WB 2 as foresha-
dowing Nietzsche’s position in EH insofar as Nietzsche attributes Wagner’s
organisation to the fact that his ‘ruling passion [became] aware of itself’, as
opposed to any conscious eﬀort on Wagner’s part (47). However, I would
respond that elsewhere in WB, Nietzsche makes it clear that he deems
Wagner’s vibrant holism to be a product of his own conscious labour (see
e.g., WB 9, p.244, cited above).
20. For an example of this, see Nietzsche’s characterisation of Wagner and
Wagner’s music in WB 9 (p. 242–3).
21. For amore recent defence of this position, see Hurka (2007, 9–31 [see esp. 17–22]).
22. See also KSA 7:30[8], 733.
23. This point is made by Rowthorn (2017, 109–10).
24. Andrew Huddleston draws the same conclusion (2014, 135–60 [fn.3]).
25. Jeﬀrey Church (2015) oﬀers an interpretation of UM that has points of
convergence and divergence with my own. Church argues (in a manner
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that harmonises with my reading) that the ‘consecration to culture’ that
Nietzsche is promoting in UM (SE 6, p.163) is ﬁgured as a voluntary aﬀair.
However, and this is where his reading departs from my own, he does not
view Nietzsche as persuading (i.e., pressuring or manipulating) his readers
into making this voluntary sacriﬁce: ‘Rather than coercing individuals,
Nietzsche draws on the power of shame that excellent individuals can
arouse in the majority’ (257). By this Church means that it is by evoking
the shame of his readers as they compare themselves to higher individuals
such as Schopenhauer that Nietzsche stimulates individuals to consecrate
themselves to culture. While this analysis of shame is illuminating and
pertinent to our current study, I would ultimately read this act of shaming
as a form of psychological coercion.
26. Nietzsche refers to this as the ‘refuge of culture’ (KSA 7:30[7], 733).
27. As Lemm (2007) suggests. See n.4 above.
28. We should note that the idea that social struggle is ideally perpetual for
Nietzsche is not denied by his agonistic readers (though they construe this
conﬂict in terms that are quite diﬀerent from those found in UM). For
example, within his political reading of Nietzsche’s agonism, David Owen
(2002, 129) submits that the ideal Nietzschean citizen ‘acknowledges both
the openness of the terms of our political association to contestation and
the demand that we submit ourselves to the rule of law even as we seek to
contest democratically particular laws.’
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